).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyaya. The _Nyaya sutras_
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of sa@mskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vais'e@sika
does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three
classifications as purvavat, s'e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta, but no
definition. The _Vais'e@sika sutras_ do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti
(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sadhya_ (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated
either in the _Nyaya sutras_ or in the Vais'e@sika.
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