[2]
If the Dutch had hitherto solicited peace, it was not that they feared the
result of war. The sea was their native element; and the fact of their
maritime superiority had long been openly or tacitly acknowledged by all
the powers of Europe. But they wisely
[Footnote 1: Heath, 320, 321.]
[Footnote 2: Compare the declaration of parliament of July 9 with that of
the States General of July 23, Aug. 2. See also Whitelock, 537; Heath,
315-322; the Journals, June 5, 11, 25, 30; and Le Clerc, i. 318-321.]
[Sidenote a: A.D. 1652. June 11.]
[Sidenote b: A.D. 1652. June 17.]
[Sidenote c: A.D. 1652. June 25.]
[Sidenote d: A.D. 1652. June 30.]
judged that no victory by sea could repay them for the losses which they
must sustain from the extinction of their fishing trade, and the suspension
of their commerce.[1] For the commonwealth, on the other hand, it was
fortunate that the depredations of Prince Rupert had turned the attention
of the leaders to naval concerns. Their fleet had been four years in
commission: the officers and men were actuated by the same spirit of civil
liberty and religious enthusiasm which distinguished the land army; Ayscue
had just returned from the reduction of Barbadoes with a powerful squadron;
and fifty additional ships were ordered to be equipped, an object easily
accomplished at a time when any merchantman capable of carrying guns could,
with a few alterations, be converted into a man-of-war.
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