Under every
disadvantage, he defended himself with spirit, and often with success. He
showed that many of the witnesses were his personal enemies, or undeserving
of credit; that his words and writings would bear a less offensive and more
probable interpretation; and that most of the facts objected to him were
either the acts of his officers, who alone ought to be responsible, or the
common decision of those boards of which he was only a single member.[1]
Thus far[a] he had conducted his defence without legal aid. To speak to
matters of law, he was allowed the aid of counsel, who contended that not
one of the offences alleged against him amounted to high treason; that
their number could not change their quality; that an endeavour to subvert
the law, or religion, or the rights of parliament, was not treason by any
statute; and that the description of an offence, so vague and indeterminate
ought never to be admitted;: otherwise the slightest transgression might,
under that denomination, be converted into the highest crime known to the
law.[2]
But the Commons, whether they distrusted the patriotism of the Lords, or
doubted the legal guilt of the prisoner, had already resolved to proceed by
attainder. After the second reading[b] of the ordinance, they sent for the
venerable prisoner to their bar, and ordered Brown, one of the managers, to
recapitulate in his
[Footnote 1: Compare his own daily account of his trial in History,
220-421, with that part published by Prynne, under the title of
Canterburies Doome, 1646; and Rushworth, v.
Pages:
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134